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A B S T R A C T   
There has been widespread interest in the potential for the significant behavioural and policy adaptations 
rendered necessary by Coronavirus to act as a catalyst for radical longer term policy change in transport. 
However, this body of work to date has been limited in its consideration of how such policy change might be 
brought about. Translating the lessons from the Coronavirus response to other ongoing strategic challenges such 
as decarbonisation requires analysis of what the pandemic has revealed about processes of policy formulation 
and how institutions responsible for policy implementation actually work. 
This paper explores the extent to which rapid policy change has actually been possible in the transport sector 
in England and Scotland during the pandemic, and key examples of how such change has been both achieved and 
blocked. Two rounds of interviews with senior stakeholders from across the transport sector were undertaken in 
June and November 2020 to inform the analysis. 
We find that the pandemic has accelerated some policy commitments that were already planned, but at a time 
of huge stress on the whole of government and its partner delivery organisations, the potential to deliver radical 
policy adaptation was limited. However, Coronavirus is recognised as being a potentially path-changing 
disruption to existing trajectories in terms of the adaptations to business practices, industry structures, ways 
of working and the public finances. Paradoxically, whilst recognising these uncertainties, decision-makers are yet 
to deviate from pre-pandemic planning assumptions and policy plans and this risks missing the opportunities to 
steer how those changes unfold.   
1. Introduction 
We have argued previously that disruptions offer an opportunity for 
policy to change (Marsden and Docherty, 2013). The Covid-19 
pandemic and the associated requirements for widespread societal re-
strictions on where, when, how much and even if we move about 
potentially presents a major opportunity to re-think transport policy. 
Many commentators have highlighted the potential for changes to policy 
to accelerate active travel (Nurse and Dunning, 2020), home working 
(Chung et al., 2020) and to re-imagine the role of high streets and public 
space (Considine, 2020). The pandemic therefore represents a major 
case-study through which to understand the potential for policy 
adaptation. 
The contentions which we established in our earlier work were that:  
1) The predominance of aggregate flow data and cross-sectional 
behavioural data hides the degree to which behaviours vary in 
everyday life in key policy debates. It also marginalises the very 
significant on-going churn in people’s lives both from life events 
(Clark et al., 2016) but also changing socio-technical configurations 
(Spurling, 2020)  
2) People have more capacity to adapt their travel behaviour when 
faced with new circumstances than is typically understood by look-
ing at what people ‘usually’ do. 
Our fundamental contention was therefore that disruptions act as 
moments of insight that reveal the true adaptive capacity of the mobility 
system, and therefore give a guide to the envelope of realistic change 
that might be made to how we travel around. This has been evidenced 
through our further research work (Marsden et al., 2020) but also 
elsewhere (What Works Centre, 2020; Sung and Monschauer, 2020). 
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Disruptions, therefore, could be a stimulus for policy to change as they 
present alternative policy pathways which have been hidden by a pre-
dominant focus on stability in behaviours and policy. However, it was 
also observed that, whilst disruptions present opportunities for policy to 
be adapted, they also pose risks. They are often associated with negative 
health and economic outcomes and, when set against the policy pref-
erence for stability and unease over ‘uncertainty’, risk being indicative 
of policy failure (Rosenbloom et al., 2019; Chappells and Trentmann, 
2018). The desire to ‘get back to normal’ following disruptions can 
stimulate actions to ‘lock out’ rather than ‘lock in’ the changes which 
have been seen even when these are generally positive. 
These accounts of the potential for policy adaptation, including most 
of the recent literature on pandemic related behaviours, have been 
limited in their incorporation of explanations of how substantive policy 
change can be brought about. To understand this requires paying 
detailed attention to processes of policy formulation, different actors’ 
assumptions about how their and others’ institutions work, and the 
relative power and influence that transport actors have as part of the 
transport policy sub-system in which they interact. In turn this requires 
reflection on the role of the transport policy sub-system within the wider 
government machine, and especially the visibility and status of transport 
and mobility concerns in a crisis affecting all policy areas. Whilst there is 
a public policy literature exploring rapid versus incremental policy 
change, limited attention has been given to whether this applies to the 
transport sector. Indeed, the transport sector has been characterised as a 
large socio-technical system (Wilson et al., 2007) or a regime (Urry, 
2004) which is generally resistant to change. Has the pandemic really 
undone this resistance to change and if so how? This paper addresses the 
question as to whether rapid policy change has actually been possible 
even in unprecedented circumstances, and how change has been either 
achieved or blocked. It does so through in-depth exploration with key 
decision-makers in the UK as the pandemic has unfolded. 
In the next section, we look to the literatures on incremental and 
radical policy change and on the politics of disruptions and disasters to 
establish a public policy perspective on the potential for change. Section 
3 introduces our study of how key stakeholders in the governance net-
works of transport policy in England and Scotland responded during the 
first nine months of the pandemic to late November 2020. We inter-
viewed representatives of the same 17 stakeholder organisations twice, 
in June/July and October/November to understand what had happened, 
what was happening at that time and what they could foresee happening 
in the coming months. Section 4 sets out the key timeline of events 
related to transport and the wider pandemic management approach in 
England and Scotland as well as aggregate data on changing travel 
patterns. Section 5 presents the analysis of the interview data set against 
the key themes of policy and institutional change. The final section 
brings the paper together in a discussion and conclusion. It argues that 
very little by the way of radical policy change has yet been possible. 
However, the nature of the Covid-19 pandemic and its impacts right 
across the economy and society mean that some critical path changing 
events are unfolding which will indeed have long-term implications for 
all aspects of transport policy. These are recognised by decision-makers 
but, as yet, there remains a significant policy inertia and a desire to 
return to previous policies, plans and business models. 
2. Policy and institutional change 
To understand the potential for the pandemic to effect rapid policy 
change requires, as we set out in the introduction, a need to consider 
how policies are made and how this is influenced by the institutional 
arrangements and practices in the transport sector. Debates about 
incrementalism and radical change and the nexus between the two have 
been on-going for some time in the wider public policy literature (van 
der Heijden and Kuhlmann, 2017). The section begins by looking at 
work on the policy process which provides insights into moments of 
change before reviewing literature on incrementalism and path 
dependency which might limit the capacity for change. 
Kingdon’s work on policy windows suggests the potential for dis-
ruptions to open up policy change (Kingdon, 1984). In Kingdon’s model 
there are three largely independent streams of problems, policies and 
politics as shown in Fig. 1. In the usual run of policy making skilled 
policy entrepreneurs are able to use focussing events (e.g. elections) to 
align the three streams and create a window of opportunity for policy 
change (Zohlnhöfer et al., 2016). 
Certainly in the case of a pandemic, there is a clear change of context 
and so the problem stream is potentially open for re-alignment. Things 
which might have been widely agreed to be ‘difficult’ such as closing 
roads or changing the ownership of public transport services might 
become ‘necessary’ and urgent. The politics stream is also changed but 
in ways which might be quite complex and volatile. What is clear from 
the pandemic is that even liberal democracies have taken actions placing 
unprecedented restrictions on individual freedoms that would ordinarily 
be unacceptable to their electorates in response to the public health 
imperative (Delanty, 2020). The policy stream may also change with 
new solutions being brought forward. The literature suggests that, in 
reality, this will be a re-emphasising of the fit of already known options 
(Cohen et al., ’s 1972 garbage can model). Different actor constellations 
could emerge as important in decision-making however, if their solu-
tions ‘fit’ the policy problem better. 
The literature developed around the ‘Politics of Attention’ is also 
relevant here (Jones and Baumgartner’s (2005)). Through extensive 
longitudinal review of US policy making, Jones and Baumgartner reflect 
on why, given the thousands of potential policy problems which gov-
ernments could focus on, they end up focussing on the few hundred that 
they do. They suggest that there is often an in-built resistance to policy 
change, partly the result of having to deliver change through extensive 
policy networks with conflicting positions on issues. A resultant feature 
of the policy system is excessive incrementalism. The contrast posed by 
Jones and Baumgartner is that an inbuilt culture of incrementalism sets 
up the potential for massive over-reactions to events such as natural 
disasters when ‘something must be done’ (Jones and Baumgartner’s 
(2005)). Crises are potentially damaging politically if mishandled and 
yet a validation of ‘effective government’ if handled well (Rubin, 2016). 
In the work of Jones and Baumgartner however, there remains evidence 
that initial claims for radical interventions can be watered down if they 
require time to be implemented and, in that time, the crisis recedes. 
Political attention can wander and other agendas re-emerge as more 
important. 
Howlett et al. (2015) critique the policy streams framework for being 
good at describing how things get onto governmental agendas but not 
how they subsequently unfold in terms of policy development. Reardon 
(2018) and Gray et al. (2016) similarly note that insufficient attention is 
paid to how policy networks constrain or facilitate decision-making. So, 
there appears to be the potential for new ideas to get on the agenda but 
whether or not change can be delivered requires greater attention to be 
paid to the design of, and power relationships evident in, institutional 
settings. 
There are several connected schools of thought on incrementalism, 
radical change and the punctuated equilibrium model as a conceptual 
framing for policy development (Lindblom, 1979; Hall, 1993; Howlett 
and Migone, 2011). Most of the work has focussed on stability within 
specific policy sub-systems, relying on the influence of dominant policy 
communities and institutional ways of working which act as a friction to 
change (Fernandez-i-Marin et al., 2019). However, May et al. (2009) 
suggest that there is a need to pay attention to what happens between 
policy sub-systems, how large exogenous shocks reverberate unevenly 
across different government bodies, and how important it is more 
generally to understand the impacts of instability on policy formulation. 
Fernandez-i-Marin et al. (2019, p3), studying the impact of economic 
crises across the whole policy system found that “economic crises lead to 
increasingly incrementalist patterns of policy change in crisis-remote 
policy subsystems and make policy punctuations in these areas less 
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likely”. In the case of Coronavirus the restrictions on everyday life have 
had profound impacts on education, healthcare, organised sport, 
entertainment, employment as well as the role and functioning of the 
transport system. The levels of public debt acquired to mitigate the 
worst of the health and economic impacts are unprecedented in peace 
time, and will have significant impacts on the discourses about how 
states rebuild their economies after the pandemic. It is therefore of huge 
empirical interest and strategic importance to understand better how the 
policy concerns and possible recovery trajectories of sectors such as 
transport are treated by the state. It is also critical to understand the 
extent to which influence the broader sweep of structural and 
macro-level policy reform undertaken by governments to support 
socio-economic rebuilding, if at all. 
Path dependency literature focuses on how the institutions involved 
in decision-making, the rules systems through which decisions are made, 
and the ways in which actors and networks engage become mutually 
reinforcing and more difficult to change over time (Low and Astle, 2009; 
Sorenson, 2015). Of particular importance is the notion of contingency, 
where choices available in a policy system today are conditioned by 
previous policy choices (North, 1990). The path dependency literature 
would suggest that even in a crisis, there is a likelihood that existing 
modes of problem resolution and mechanisms for action will predomi-
nate. This may though be an overstatement resulting from the tendency 
for path dependency research to think about stability rather than change 
(Kay, 2005). The scale and urgency of the situation precipitated by the 
pandemic could generate sufficient necessity to innovate or re-imagine 
the delivery of policy and so provides an important opportunity to 
learn about the influence of path dependencies when faced with rapidly 
changing circumstances. 
In summary, different literatures point to various mechanisms 
through which large scale disruptions such as this pandemic might act as 
important moments when there is real potential for radical policy 
adaptation but the institutional literature points to why this potential 
may not be realised. Consideration of these literatures leads us to three 
key questions:  
• How do policy sub-systems behave when faced with disruptions 
across whole of government?  
• In what ways do institutional path dependencies limit the pace and 
nature of the governance response?  
• Which policy windows are opened and which are closed by cross- 
system disruption? 
To understand these questions requires in-depth engagement with 
those actors involved in developing policy responses from a local to a 
national level during the pandemic and the approach adopted is set out 
in Section 3. 
3. Methods 
The method adopted here was a novel longitudinal panel of expert 
policy maker interviews across the public and private sector and na-
tional, sub-national and local government and NGOs including elite 
actors.1 Individuals from 17 organisations were interviewed having 
been identified as part of a purposeful sampling strategy designed to 
capture knowledge from critical information-rich people in key senior 
positions (see Patton, 2002; Suri, 2011, Fig. 2). Organisations from 
different scales of government and transport operating companies were 
included to generate a clear understanding of funding and policy 
changes to all of the main modes and networks, and to be able to explore 
this in national and local settings in England and Scotland. The in-
dividuals identified provided insight into how different elements of the 
transport policy sub-system, from strategic policy formulation through 
to service delivery, were responding to the demands of the pandemic. 
The sample does not contain any predominantly rural local authorities 
but does contain major city region combined authorities which have a 
mix of highly urbanised and more rural areas. We note that this data set 
will be unique in so far as it is extremely difficult to get senior policy 
actors to engage in such activities during a crisis given the pressures they 
face. None of the people we approached declined to participate and they 
represent leading executives, civil servants or politicians in their 
respective fields. 
Most interviews (N = 13) were conducted with a single individual, 
the remainder being interviews with either two or three people. The 
same people were interviewed each time with the exception of one 
member of a group interview (Bus and Coach) who was not involved in 
wave 2, and an additional national government stakeholder (National 
England 2) being added to wave 2 of the panel after recommendation by 
a colleague. 
All of the interviews were conducted over Microsoft Teams by the 
authors and were all of 1 h in duration. Each round of interviews took 
the form of a set of semi-structured conversations based around a 
common set of questions which can be found in the supplementary 
materials. The questions were tailored somewhat for each stakeholder 
(e.g. discussions of bus patronage or cycling uptake applied differently) 
and were informed by recent data on usage and policy announcements. 
Fig. 1. Diagram of Kingdon’s multiple streams approach (adapted from Jones et al., 2016).  
1 The research was part of a larger COVID19 Transport, Travel and Social 
Adaptation Study which includes a three wave longitudinal household panel 
survey in 10 regions across Great Britain and qualitative panel interviews with 
over 100 citizens. 
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In Wave 2, we used the responses from the interviews in Wave 1 to 
prompt reflection on how things had changed (e.g. “Back in June you 
suggested that the messaging was confusing because …“). This was, by 
its nature, bespoke to each interview but sat within the overall structure 
of the question set. 
The interviews took place between 20th May and 18th June for 
round one of the interviews and between 5th October and 4th December 
for round two of the interviews. This broadly coincided with a period 
where actors were contemplating an end to the first complete lockdown 
and then, in wave 2, anticipating or experiencing the second full lock-
down (See Fig. 3). In each case, more than half of the interviews were 
completed in the first third of the survey period with one or two being 
difficult to schedule which extended the period. The interview schedule 
was not piloted but proved to fit to the length of time allotted and 
enabled flexibility across the different stakeholders. 
Whilst full transcripts of the interviews have been produced the 
analysis presented here has been based on extensive summaries which 
were produced immediately after each interview from notes taken 
during the interviews themselves, and which included direct quotes that 
could be checked for accuracy from the Microsoft Teams recording. In 
total, this material comprises around 100 pages of data. Our analytical 
approach was a descriptive/interpretive lens where we clustered re-
sponses around a series of themes, including those which were identified 
by the literature review. We took the decision to thematically cluster the 
findings as we progressed and sought validation from participants about 
our analysis by sharing research highlights from our findings at the end 
of each round of interviews as part of our assurance process. The themes 
which we used are in Table 1. 
A methodological observation is how rapidly the narrative could 
change during even our relatively short period of interviews, for 
example as a new set of restrictions or easing of restrictions was 
announced by government. 
This research has been based on experiences in England and Scot-
land. The interconnectivity of places, the strategies of virus manage-
ment, the structure of the transport industry, institutional traditions (see 
Hirschorn, 2020) and the relationship between governments and citi-
zens has been revealed to be very different across the world and has 
produced hugely different social and health outcomes (Ashraf, 2020). 
Comparative studies of how the policy responses play out over time will 
be hugely significant in advancing our understanding of the policy 
process in different settings and we hope this article provides some 
structure to such exercises. 
4. Coronavirus policy context in the UK 
The UK experienced its first two known cases of SARS CO-v2 viral 
infection – hereafter ‘Coronavirus’ – on 3rd February from two students 
returning from China. As with many countries, adaptations to daily life 
began to be made by individuals in advance of firm government action. 
Initially favouring a basic public health strategy of promoting hand 
washing and physical distancing, it was not until the 23rd of March that 
the UK went in to ‘lockdown’, i.e. a general ‘stay at home’ order and the 
enforced closure of non-essential activities2 from which it was not 
released until June. The profile of infections, deaths and the main 
changes in activity restrictions levels from the start of the pandemic to 
the end of our second round of interviews are shown on Fig. 3.3 The full 
picture is complex with many regular updates and nuances to rules, 
particularly on local restrictions, which are not necessary to communi-
cate here.4 The UK strategy did not avert one of the highest per capita 
death rates from the virus in Europe, and indeed globally, which pro-
vides an important backdrop to any transport policy reflection (Stewart, 
2021). 
The outturn data for changes in the use of motorised transport is 
shown in Fig. 4, with equivalent cycling data shown in Fig. 5. A sample 
of key decisions which impacted particularly on the transport sector is 
set out in Table 2. Here we reflect on the broad sweep of transport 
behaviour change over the period. First, it is highly notable that the 
reductions in travel volumes preceded the formal introduction of lock-
down in the UK by 2–3 weeks. The initial lockdown was very restrictive 
in closing schools, requiring those who could work from home to do so 
and closing all non-essential businesses. This is reflected in the collapse 
of public transport patronage and substantial decline in car and goods 
vehicle trips. Physical distancing restrictions were set at 2 m which 
limited the effective capacity of public transport to around 30% of pre- 
Covid levels. As Fig. 5 shows, there was a considerable boom in cycling 
which was largely leisure trips as part of the one daily opportunity given 
for exercise. By the end of June, 5% of the population (1.3 million 
people) had bought a bike (Long, 2020). 
Over time, the restrictions on which parts of the economy were 
allowed to function were relaxed, although it was not until mid-June 
when hospitality began to re-open. Levels of car use and public trans-
port grew over time in late summer/early autumn. Whilst car traffic 
reached levels of around 85–90% of its pre-Covid peak, bus reached only 
60% and rail 40%. In England, physical distancing limits were reduced 
Fig. 2. Expert sample for longitudinal interviews.  
2 See https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-address-to-the-nation- 
on-coronavirus-23-march-2020.  
3 A very serious second wave of infections and deaths took hold in the UK 
immediately after the end of our second round of interviews in December 2020.  
4 Coronavirus was also the most stringent test to date of the UK’s asymmetric 
system of devolved government and the devolved administrations themselves. 
See McCorkindale and McHarg (2020) for a review of the key issues as they 
pertain to Scotland. 
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to ‘1 m+’ on public transport and additional supply was provided ahead 
of demand to avoid overcrowding on any services. By early September, 
once the schools returned, around 90% of rail and almost all buses were 
in service although usually to adapted timetables (Interview data). 
In general Scotland has taken a more cautious approach to re- 
opening activities and the key differences are highlighted in Table 1 
(see also McCorkindale and McHarg, 2020). Of particular note were the 
retention of 2 m ‘where possible’ and not supporting a limited return for 
office workers in the Autumn. An important contextual difference is the 
fiscal structure of devolution: Scotland’s funding settlement derives 
from a UK Government block grant transfer determined by a largely 
population-based formula (the so-called ‘Barnett Formula’). In practice, 
this means that when the UK Government makes decisions to provide 
additional public expenditure support for e.g. rail services or buses in 
England, then an additional formula based payment or ‘consequential’ is 
added to the Scottish budget. However, for services such as the Clyde, 
Hebridean and Northern Isles ferries where no such equivalent exists in 
England, there is no consequential pass through and so funds have to be 
found from within the wider Scottish budget.6 In general however, our 
respondents painted a broadly similar set of issues and options in both 
England and Scotland and so this article treats the sample as a whole, 
leaving the implications of devolution for further work. 
5. Findings 
The thematic findings have been clustered around the three key 
questions which emerged from the literature review in Section 2. The 
section concludes with an overall reflection on the difficulties which 
decision-makers reported on taking decisions during a rapidly devel-
oping crisis. The final section also sets out some of the longer-term 
changes or risks to previously held planning assumptions which our 
interviewees could agree upon. 
5.1. Transport as a policy sub-system 
The pandemic is, first and foremost, a profound public health crisis. 
All of the stakeholders interviewed were clear across both waves of the 
research that transport stakeholders and organisations were rule takers 
and not shapers or influencers of public health decisions. Choices such as 
those over when to move into strict lockdown, significantly reduce 
public transport provision, and the 2 m and ‘1 m+’ thresholds for 
physical distancing were taken to reduce the risk of transmission of the 
virus, with little or no consideration of the knock-on impacts on the 
transport sector more generally. 
The transport sector was largely (and arguably somewhat remark-
ably) unprepared for Coronavirus, despite a global pandemic having 
been listed as the number one risk on the UK Government national risk 
register for many years.7 This simple fact had not cascaded down into 
Fig. 3. Coronavirus cases and deaths for UK with major changes in restrictions marked.  
Table 1 
Themes used to cluster insights.  
Theme Descriptor 
Preparedness How had organisations planned for pandemics and how did 
their preparedness help 
Messaging What kinds of communication was being provided and by 
whom – in particular with reference to social distancing 
guidance and avoiding public transport 
Funding How had emergency or additional funding been decided and 
routed and when in the process 
Modal Use How were travel patterns changing and who understood what 
about why these patterns were seen 
Wider Impacts How were city centres performing and what other shifts in 
sectors such as retail were being monitored 
New Policies Which new transport and related policies were being 
implemented, which had opportunities opening up and which 
were being closed down by the pandemic 
Forecasting What time window(s) for forward planning were being used 
Uncertainties What issues were making looking ahead difficult and what 
would enable those to become clearer 
Governance Issues What processes, institutional norms and which organisations 
were determining what got done and how, and what was 
proving easy/difficult to achieve 
Recovery What types of projects and policies were being thought about 
to stimulate recovery after the pandemic and what logics 
underpinned these 
Changes to World 
Views 
Had the pandemic made the participants rethink any aspects 
of how the mobility system might work 
Data What data were being used and what was missing  
5 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/transport-use-during-the- 
coronavirus-covid-19-pandemic.  
6 The Scottish Government also has extremely limited borrowing powers. See 
https://www.gov.scot/publications/scottish-public-finance-manual/borrowing 
-lending-and-investment/borrowing-lending-and-investment/.  
7 See https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-54523761. 
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operational planning in any significant way. Despite the very clear 
recognition that public transport was an essential service for key 
workers, pandemic plans described to us focused almost solely on the 
implications of operational staff absence as an impact on business as 
usual as opposed to any consideration of the scale and impact on society 
of lockdown and/or mass fatalities from the disease itself. There had 
been no studies of transmission risk in public transport conducted by our 
stakeholders or which they were aware of and therefore the sector also 
had little to offer upwards to government in terms of evidence to inform 
its decision making with regard to public health. 
Very shortly after lockdown, recognition was widespread that 
Coronavirus represents a profound economic crisis as well as a direct 
public health crisis. Whole sectors of the economy were stopped or 
significantly curtailed with £70Bn of spending commitments announced 
by September 2020, predominantly on supporting the wages or 
livelihoods of workers or businesses affected and health interventions 
(NAO, 2020). The levels of additional subsidy committed to re-establish 
public transport services (£5.4Bn in England in the period to September 
2020) are huge from a sectoral perspective, but relatively small in terms 
of overall Government spending (8% by value and 4% by number of 
spending pledges). 
So, whilst transport was recognised as important in the on-going 
provision of services for key workers who might not have access to a 
car, it is still a small part of a much bigger set of issues which were 
dynamically unfolding. One of the key markers of how much the man-
agement of this crisis was being driven by a small group of decision- 
makers from the public health domain was the stark, simplistic 
messaging to “Avoid Public Transport”. None of the behavioural psy-
chologists on the Government’s Independent Scientific Pandemic In-
sights Group on Behaviours (‘SPI-B’) are recognised travel behaviour 
Fig. 4. Percentage change in miles travelled relative to an equivalent day or week.55  
Fig. 5. Percentage change in miles travelled relative to an equivalent day or week for cycling.  




Timeline of key transport related policy changes March–December 2020.  
Date Action Source 




23rd March Government announces lock down–shelter in place, no gatherings, leave home only for basic necessities, medical care, solo 
exercise or to work if absolutely necessary 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-address-to-the-nation-on- 
coronavirus-23-march-2020 
23rd March Rail Emergency Management Arrangements put in place with all cost risk taken by Government. Train Operating Companies 
receive maximum 2% fee 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/rail-emergency-measures-duri 
ng-the-covid-19-pandemic 
3rd April £167 m bus rescue package announced to fund running of 50% of all services on top of £200 m of payments that would have been 
due normally and £30 m top up funds for new essential services. Services to run with no net profit. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/almost-400-million-to-keep-englands 
-buses-running 
April to May Transport Scotland confirms with operators the re-allocation of Bus Service Operators Grant and Concessionary Fares Support for 
operators with obligation to deliver 25–35% of services. 
https://www.transport.gov.scot/public-transport/buses/covid-19-support- 
grant/ 
28th April £10 m Spaces for People Fund announced for Scotland for accelerating walking, cycling and disabled access https://www.sustrans.org.uk/our-blog/projects/2020/scotland/spaces-for- 
people-making-essential-travel-and-exercise-safer-during-coronavirus/ 
9th May £2bn fund for walking and cycling over 5 years announced including £250 m to be spent on emergency active travel measures https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/transport-secretarys-state 
ment-on-coronavirus-covid-19-9-may-2020 
14th May Transport for London receives £1.6bn emergency funding, including a £500 m loan and a commitment to increase bus and 
underground fares 1% above inflation and limits to concessionary fare users 
http://content.tfl.gov.uk/extraordinary-funding-and-financing-agreemen 
t-may-2020.pdf 
26th May A further £20 m announced for Scottish Spaces for People Fund https://www.transport.gov.scot/coronavirus-covid-19/transport-transiti 
on-plan/adapting-our-transport-systems/ 
28th May £254 m more bus funding announced for a further 12 weeks https://www.gov.uk/government/news/almost-400-million-to-keep-englands 
-buses-running 
29th May Tranche 1 Emergency Active Travel Fund allocations announced for urgent schemes including pop up infrastructure (£42 m) https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-active-travel-fun 
d-local-transport-authority-allocations 
15th June Wearing of face masks on public transport compulsory with limited exemptions (e.g. young children) https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-53045386 
19th June COVID-19 Support Grant - Restart (CSG-R) launched in Scotland to support additional services with £191.3 m being announced in 
phases (June, August, October, December) through to March 2021 
https://www.transport.gov.scot/public-transport/buses/covid-19-support- 
grant/ 




30th June Launch of e-scooter trial rules in England by Department for Transport https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/e-scooter-trials-guidance-for- 
local-areas-and-rental-operators 
7th July £9 m in emergency funding for Glasgow Subway and Edinburgh Tram to end of September, extended in September and December 
to total £21 m through to March 2021 
https://www.transport.gov.scot/news/emergency-support-for-glasgow-subwa 
y-and-edinburgh-trams/ 
27th July Launch of Department for Transport Gear Change strategy https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cycling-and-walking-plan-fo 
r-england 
8th August Bus services outside London receive up to £218.4 million of support over eight weeks, with further rolling funding at up to £27.3 




21st September Emergency Recovery Measures Agreements (ERMAs) introduced for rail for up to 18 months. At the end of the agreements current 
franchises will expire. Management fees capped at 1.5% 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/rail-update-emergency-recovery- 
measures-agreements 
31st October Settlement agreed with Transport for London to 31st March 2021 of £1bn, of which £95 m is loans. Conditions include fares 
increases, operational efficiencies, expansion of ULEZ, cancelling Crossrail 2 preparatory work, additional TfL board scrutiny 
from central government. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/transport-for-london-settleme 
nt-letter 
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experts. Whilst all of our interviewees understood that this was a mes-
sage derived directly from the need to avoid transmission of the virus 
through overcrowding on vehicles and at stops, they were also acutely 
aware that it would be hugely damaging to public confidence in public 
transport in the long-term. 
“I was surprised as anybody in the sector when the PM did the first 
briefing about avoid public transport … I cannot remember whether I just 
shouted at the TV or I put my head in my hands” (National Government, 
England). 
This is perhaps the most stark example of transport as a rule taker 
that we heard from any of the interviewees, demonstrating that the 
transport sector seems to have had little influence on both this most 
fundamental of messaging with regards to its own operation and sus-
tainability, but also the timeframes over which to prepare and react to 
such fundamental disruption. In short, as a policy sub-system within 
government, transport is some way from the heart of critical decision- 
making. 
5.2. Path dependencies 
Two aspects which significantly shaped how decisions unfolded in 
the transport sector were the number of immediate operational issues to 
be addressed in response to unprecedented changes in travel behaviour 
and the speed with which these needed to be addressed. This was true 
across all scales of government, transport service providers and even the 
NGOs and other bodies working in partnership with them. 
In the UK bus industry, operators had as little as one to two weeks of 
cash reserves to sustain operations and so an urgent response was 
required from central government if the sector was to avoid collapse. 
These circumstances necessitated a new approach to funding incumbent 
operating companies but also rethinking how existing subsidies (e.g. for 
concessionary fares) would work in conditions of vastly different de-
mand patterns. By contrast, the rail industry, which operated on a much 
more highly regulated basis with detailed franchise agreements let by 
government already had a statutory process available through which 
operators could exit their commercial contract commitments and move 
to an Emergency Management Arrangement providing an agreed level of 
service at fixed cost to government. Nonetheless, given the huge loss of 
cash flow, with passenger reductions of more than 95%, such decisions 
also had to be made quickly to maintain the operational viability of 
services. 
Given that the crisis presented a period of two weeks at most to act, it 
is perhaps unsurprising that the search for solutions on how to organise 
the funding of public transport largely focused on pre-existing mecha-
nisms. As noted above, the legislative arrangements for the rail industry8 
moved swiftly initially to Emergency Management Agreements where 
the companies were given a specified volume of rail services to deliver 
and paid a fee for doing so. The operational specification of the rail 
network had therefore moved away entirely from the commercial basis 
on which it had been run since 1994 in a matter of weeks. However, a 
complete overhaul of the rail franchise system had already been pro-
posed as part of a pre-pandemic Government commissioned review, 
albeit one that had seen its publication repeatedly delayed (Williams, 
2019). The approach to re-working franchises would probably have 
been phased in as franchises naturally came to an end, but an acceptance 
of a need to reform was already in place. The pandemic accelerated the 
reform, although it is important to state that the form of provision of rail 
services after the pandemic has yet to be determined. 
For bus, in order to avoid (perceived) legal issues over state aid, 
emergency funding for the sector had to be delivered through a mech-
anism of contracting for service provision. The choice was whether to do 
this nationally or locally. Both in England and Scotland these funds have 
been channelled nationally despite there being an elaborate multi-level 
governance arrangement for transport including bus policy in both 
countries (Marsden and Docherty, 2019). Publicly owned and operated 
systems such as light rail/tram networks were able to fall back to some 
degree on cash reserves which local authorities are required to hold. 
This deferred, rather than removed, the need for financial support for a 
short period given the scale of patronage loss also seen on these systems 
but this gave national governments additional time to respond. The past 
choices of institutional arrangements shaped the speed and nature of the 
response required. 
Particularly in the first wave of interviews participants remarked on 
how quickly decisions on issues such as emergency funding were being 
taken by central government. They contrasted this with the deliberately 
slow and bureaucratic workings that characterised decision making 
prior to the pandemic. The size of policy networks involved in decisions 
was reported to have shrunk which reduced the potential for conflicts 
and sped up decisions. There were perceived downsides to this: whilst 
channels were open for feeding in concerns, decisions were regularly 
being taken which took our participants by surprise, such as the length 
of funding settlements or changing guidance on mask wearing. Several 
elite interviewees recounted hearing about critical decisions for the first 
time at the same moment as the public: “We find ourselves listening to 
the 5 o’clock briefings wondering what’s coming next” (Local Govern-
ment, England). 
The vastly increased levels of public subsidy currently being made 
available for public transport represent a major change in the overall 
direction of policy to commercialise provision that has been unfolding 
for 40 years (see Cowie and Ison, 2018). Local government stakeholders 
argued that the pandemic opened up a window of opportunity to do 
things differently by exerting more public sector control over the bus 
industry, something that many had been seeking to bring about for some 
time. The reality was quite different for two main reasons. First, the 
pandemic was hugely resource intensive in almost every organisation. In 
both local and national government, staff were redeployed to front-line 
Coronavirus-facing roles, with consequent reductions in strategic ca-
pacity in regulatory decision making just at the moment when the 
window for alternative approaches opened for the first time in years. In 
the bus and rail industries, attention was focussed on the safe moth-
balling and later recommissioning of bus and rolling stock fleets, rede-
signing how users would access services to meet physical distancing 
requirements, and managing staff safety at work. Coupled with this 
there were the same management issues facing all organisations of 
moving activities on-line and dealing with staff absences due to illness. It 
was put to us that, at least in the early stages, there was essentially no 
capacity to consult or to think about changing approaches to 
governance. 
The second reason follows from more than a decade of austerity and 
the extent to which local authority capacity had been hollowed out 
during the period following the global financial crisis in 2008. Even if 
there had been a will to hand more powers to local authorities to manage 
the situation ‘on the ground’ (which it was far from clear was the case), it 
was suggested by our interviewees that only a handful would in fact 
have had the expertise to do so (NGO, Consultant and National Gov-
ernment). A ‘mixed-model’ where some powers were devolved to some 
authorities (supported by City Region Actors) but not others was 
described as too complex to deliver and hence justify given the intensity 
of the crisis (National Government). The feasible action set was shaped 
by past decisions on the limited role of local government in transport 
provision. Several years of devolution of transport to the largest cities 
appears not to have resulted in any meaningful establishment of trust or 
deeper accountability for spending funds by national government. 
Indeed, in London, the Department for Transport exerted increased 
control by placing new policy, efficiency and governance oversight 
8 The original infrastructure owning company in the privatised rail sector, 
Railtrack, collapsed in 2002. The rail sector therefore has some relatively recent 
experience of applying the emergency measures contained in its governing 
legislation. 
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conditions on the Mayor of London (DfT, 2020a) reversing, to some 
degree at least, what has been universally accepted to have been an 
effective devolution reform. 
5.3. New policy windows? 
The emergency adaptations made to public transport funding 
mechanisms were therefore focused on preserving the existing networks 
and avoiding the collapse of the organisations that own and operate 
them. This section focusses on new policy opportunities that emerged 
during the pandemic and their implications. 
One of the most salient policy responses was an Emergency Active 
Travel Fund in England and an equivalent Spaces for People programme 
in Scotland. These were developed in the early weeks of the pandemic 
reflecting the need to provide alternative means of local travel for 
essential purposes such as food shopping given the limited capacity on 
public transport and the requirement to maintain physical distancing 
between increased numbers of people using local neighbourhood cen-
tres. This coincided with a more than doubling of cycling (see Fig. 5) as 
people were allowed to exercise outside the home during lockdown. 
Whilst some local authorities were very proactive in seeking funds from 
the schemes, others were more reticent. The consensus view from our 
interviewees was that the schemes tended to reward authorities such as 
the larger city councils with sufficient capacity to have an existing 
pipeline of active travel schemes that could be accelerated once addi-
tional funding was made available. The powers to implemented exper-
imental and temporary traffic management orders already existed but a 
small modification was made to the process for approval in England to 
allow for digital communication of proposals.9 The Department for 
Transport launched a major new walking and cycling strategy in En-
gland in early May which set out a £2bn five year programme of funding 
for active travel. 
The focus on active travel marks an important policy change in two 
principal ways, first by representing significant reallocation of road 
space away from the car, and secondly by the pace of its implementa-
tion. However, despite planning to move ‘at pace’, it in fact took several 
months for the funding for Round 1 of the schemes to be agreed and 
assigned in England. Interviews confirmed that authorities had largely 
brought forward schemes they already had ‘on the shelf’ (Local Au-
thorities, NGO) and that the English national strategy ‘Gear Change’ 
(DfT, 2020b) had been planned anyway with the funding already 
committed prior to the pandemic (National Government, England). By 
the time of our November interviews the early optimism about the 
pandemic being a trigger for substantially increased levels of walking 
and especially cycling had largely evaporated, the spring spike in cycling 
levels having largely disappeared. 
Two other announcements were also made which were identified by 
interviewees as having been brought forward by the pandemic and 
having the potential to play a part in a ‘green recovery’ for transport 
different to that trajectory envisaged before the pandemic. The first, in 
England, was the introduction of a series of city centre e-scooter pilot 
zones (DfT, 2020c). This too had been planned but was brought forward. 
Its credentials as a solution to travel problems were weak given that the 
scooters are operating in city centres which have had only a fraction of 
the footfall normally seen (Local Government, England). Finally, the 
decision on phasing out the sale of Internal Combustion Engine Vehicles 
(by 2030) was brought forward as part of a 10 Point Green Recovery 
Plan announced by the Prime Minister (Johnson, 2020). Again, this had 
been subject to a consultation and was an announcement that would 
have been made in any case in the run up to Glasgow hosting COP26 in 
November had that gone ahead on its original dates (National 
Government, England). 
Therefore, we were directed to examples from across the policy space 
suggesting substantial capacity for governments to accelerate policy 
work which was already underway ahead of normal timescales but not 
to develop new policies. Harder to identify and understand are the 
policy changes which would have happened but which are now stalled 
or cancelled. The Transport Decarbonisation Plan has, as one example, 
been put back a few months due to the volume of policy announcements 
for other purposes and the introduction of Clean Air Zones was delayed. 
5.4. Strategic foresight? 
No-one currently making transport policy in the UK has lived 
through a policy crisis of this nature and magnitude. There was uni-
versally high levels of uncertainty across all of our interviewees and 
across both waves of the interviews. For example, when asked to make 
projections six months ahead as to where levels of demand might be we 
were repeatedly told that the planning timescales were currently weeks 
not months. The cognitive dissonance of this was remarked on and 
should not be underestimated given decision makers’ careers are often 
focused on projects that take years if not decades to come to fruition. A 
public transport industry representative told us “Last time [in June] we 
were talking about ramping up, now we’re going backwards …” and that 
they were “not so much about putting dates on things” but thinking 
about what would need to happen when different pandemic restrictions 
could be lifted. It was suggested that no-one knew where things would 
re-start from once physical distancing requirements were removed. The 
critical questions were about the timescale and efficacy of vaccines. 
Even so, in late November, it was still unclear to our interviewees what 
would happen “I don’t know, I’d be lying if I said I did” (National 
Government, Scotland). 
A loose categorisation of the impacts that our interviewees could 
agree upon was:  
• The experience of the pandemic – amplified by the unprecedented 
‘avoid public transport’ messaging discussed above – would be 
materially damaging for public transport patronage in the medium to 
long term, and would be worse for rail given its stronger orientation 
towards city centre commuting and business travel which has largely 
shifted on-line;  
• Following on from the above, any recovery in public transport 
patronage would take a long period of time, more like years than 
months, and potentially build slowly;  
• That working from home would be lower than it was during 
pandemic restrictions but very much higher than pre-Covid;  
• That business trips would not return to near pre-pandemic levels 
because of the cost and productivity advantages of, and levels of 
experience in, using internet teleconferencing tools;  
• Some people would not return to public transport at all (either due to 
ongoing public health fears and/or embedded change in travel 
habits) and would move to travelling by car;  
• On-line shopping would remain higher than pre-pandemic and there 
would generally be more freight movements especially for home 
delivery  
• Any shift to home working has the potential to lead to fewer but 
longer commutes by relocating further away from workplaces that 
are travelled to less often;  
• The relocation of people to the suburbs may offer opportunities for 
more and better local amenities which people could access without 
the car. 
Views on changes to active travel were more mixed with uncertainty 
about whether the rise in leisure travel could be converted to the 
commute. Whilst many believed that ongoing physical distancing re-
strictions could lead to car traffic growth as former public transport 




G. Marsden and I. Docherty                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Transport Policy 110 (2021) 86–97
95
reductions in commuting and business travel. We feel it important to 
note that there had been very little engagement with businesses or city 
centre property developers and owners to understand the dynamic at the 
heart of this issue, which is how and where will people work in future. 
We were also surprised by how little mention there was of the impacts of 
the anticipated severe recession on different types of travel and different 
places. 
One of the most immediately striking elements of the interviews, 
which persisted across both waves, was the dissonance between the 
narrative on the one hand that whilst ‘everything’ in the wider economy 
was changing (as set out in the bullet points above), those with re-
sponsibilities for long-term strategic planning were continuing to func-
tion as if nothing out of the ordinary was happening at all. For example, 
Highways England (HE), which manages the motorway and trunk roads 
network in England receives funding from a partial ring-fencing of 
Vehicle Excise Duty, and so have a designated long term funding pool 
from which to deliver their £27bn roads programme. Whilst we were 
informed that HE is actively looking to understand what changing work 
and business practices might mean for future traffic demand, there was 
no suggestion that projects ready for implementation that had been 
justified on the basis of pre-pandemic demand assumptions would be re- 
evaluated. Similarly, some organisations involved in strategic planning 
for large scale public transport schemes within or between urban areas 
told us that although the economic justification or ‘business case’ for 
these kinds of projects already appears to be potentially much more 
uncertain (or even in some cases unviable) given the substantial change 
in travel demand, there was no inclination to do anything other than 
continue with them. Thus although there remains (and will do for some 
time) an absence of any clear knowledge about the potential envelope of 
travel demand over even the medium term, there has not yet (as of 
March 2021) been any substantive alteration made to the planned 
capital investment profile for transport infrastructure. In England, con-
sistency with the national transport forecasts and wider econometric 
modelling assumptions has long been seen to be central to the success of 
individual projects’ business cases for funding (see Lyons and Marsden, 
2021). We were told by several participants that until the Department 
for Transport issues an edict to change how scheme development and 
appraisal takes place then business as usual will prevail. By contrast, the 
policy actors in Scotland were more alive to likely programmatic im-
pacts, partly because modelling outcomes have been less important in 
scheme prioritisation, but also because the Scottish Government’s sec-
ond Strategic Transport Projects Review was ongoing at the time of the 
onset of the pandemic. 
One of the common responses to the uncertainty from all in-
terviewees involved in strategic planning and business case develop-
ment was that, if the initial rationale for a scheme could not be justified 
post-pandemic, then effort was likely to be made first to justify the 
scheme with respect to a different logic rather than explore alternatives 
to the scheme itself. By November, rail sector respondents were fluent in 
articulating the scope to recast spending on electrification and new 
rolling stock from the previous rationale of capacity expansion objec-
tives to decarbonisation if the commute did not recover substantially. If 
this kind of pivot were not possible, then repurposing funds within the 
transport sector for other reasons such as addressing investment and 
economic performance imbalances was identified as a priority. This 
desire to safeguard funds despite material change to the circumstances 
under which they were allocated is undoubtedly characteristic of large 
social-technical systems such as rail and road networks given the scale of 
industry investment and the power of the tight policy networks that are 
able to ‘lock-in’ spending. 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
Reflecting on the intersection between the literature on radical and 
incremental change from Section 2 and the interview data we generate 
some important findings. First, the pandemic has actually proven to be a 
very limited window to enact change in transport policy. Indeed, rather 
than being a crisis put to work and not to waste, perhaps Coronavirus is 
simply too big a crisis for a distant policy sub-sector that receives 
comparatively little government attention to mobilise as a means to 
realign the direction of the policy stream. Coupled with this, the need to 
take decisions quickly and focus on maintaining operational resilience 
has also contributed to the reinforcement of existing institutional 
mechanisms which were stretched and made to fit the new circum-
stances. Previous decisions to reduce the regulatory capability and in-
fluence of the public sector in many places set a path for action 
dominated by central government control and focused on preserving the 
entities responsible for existing operational provision. Thus the crisis 
reinforced the centralising tendencies of the UK Government particu-
larly with respect to the scope for city-region level transport bodies to 
adopt distinctive policy approaches. 
Those policy changes that were implemented were already in the 
pipeline and have been accelerated in an attempt to intervene expedi-
ently faced with challenges such as the need to maintain physical 
distancing. So, whilst it can be argued that the political stream has felt a 
clear need to respond, any change in the nature or direction of the policy 
stream has actually been very limited. At a more local scale some au-
thorities have raised the profile of active travel interventions which 
could mark a substantive change in direction of policy over the medium 
to long term, although this remains uncertain. To date however, levels of 
spending in places that have received funding amount to less than £1 per 
capita ($1.3 US), which given the very low active travel infrastructure 
base in the UK suggests the narrative of rapid change here is running 
ahead of action. Those schemes that were progressed were reported to 
have been done so most efficiently by those local authorities retaining 
the greatest professional skills base and who already had coherent plans. 
This assessment was neatly summarised by one local authority respon-
dent who told us “What does this mean for transport? We will continue 
to do what we’re doing” (Local authority, England). 
So, what might we conclude about the potential for disruptions of the 
scale of the pandemic to act as catalysts for substantial, and potentially 
radical change? Above all, our analysis leads us to think carefully about 
the timescales over which we consider it possible to implement policy 
change, how our institutions define expectations about the speed of 
response, and the role of individual professionals within the institutions 
responsible for transport policy. The politics of attention literature 
would suggest little likelihood of change beyond what was seen in the 
eye of the crisis. Once that short-term window is closed and something 
else is on the agenda then the chances of re-igniting policy debate is 
limited. However, and particularly for large socio-technical systems 
such as transport with highly organised policy networks, the idea of an 
immediate and sustainable shift in direction seems somewhat fanciful. 
We were particularly stuck by the testimony of some interviewees who, 
having wished for a more progressive or radical policy environment for 
many years, found their organisations unable to change policy priorities 
in what they perceived as an opportunity to do so. Added to this, the 
rather fixed nature of land-use and the transport networks and associ-
ated journey characteristics associated with connecting those land-uses 
also means that the absolute scope for change on the ground in the short 
term has obvious limitations. One year into pandemic restrictions it is 
difficult to see change as anything other than incremental. 
More radical and truly path changing implications might yet arise 
from the pandemic in due course, with some of these identified explicitly 
by many of our interviewees. The more plausible potential outcomes 
that we discussed in our interviews included:  
1) Increased general acceptance in both the policy community and 
across the public more widely that more active travel is essential for 
improved public health, key to creating more liveable, high quality 
urban environments, and something which can actually be delivered 
by the policy system over relatively short timescales; 
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2) The potential for substantial decline in the peak hour commute may 
result in a strategic rethink of the purpose and funding model which 
underpins the transport system, but for rail in particular given its 
particular demand characteristics;  
3) The switch of business trips to on-line platforms, which, if sustained, 
at the very least challenges the existing justification for many large 
infrastructure projects for longer distance travel often predicated on 
the value of time ‘lost’ whilst travelling;  
4) The generation of a new dynamic between city centres and suburbs 
which, whilst unclear, at least has the potentially to radically change 
how cities work, what happens where, and therefore why many 
people travel as part of their everyday lives. 
Taken together, these shifts would represent a scale of disruption 
marking out the pandemic as an event of historical importance in terms 
of the development of transport and mobility. If those people who have 
worked from home during the pandemic continue to do so for two days a 
week this will take around 15% of trips and car miles out of the morning 
commute (Marsden et al., 2021). This could fundamentally alter the 
economics of the property market, car ownership and public transport 
provision for everyone. Such changes would have substantial distribu-
tional impacts and such post-pandemic adjustments might become 
another locus of political tension over social inequality. This is what 
makes the preference for planning as if the pandemic has just been a 
‘blip’ as so important. It is not that our interviewees do not recognise 
that things could change, it is just that they are not yet able to, or in some 
cases even interested in, tackling what this might really mean. 
The future position of public finances, political attitudes to fiscal 
repair and the socio-economic restructuring effects of the impending 
recession also need to be factored in to thinking about changing policy 
pathways. In the UK, the Office for Budget Responsibility forecasts that 
the recession will be the worst for 300 years (Lilly et al., 2020). Although 
the OECD10 has warned against a return to austerity as a response to the 
economic challenges of Coronavirus, the March 2021 budget indicated 
that the UK government may well choose to move away from simply 
printing money to subsidise the economy – and within this, public 
transport networks – before long (Bloomberg, 2021). How and at what 
pace this happens, and how the future tax and fares revenue mix is 
structured was identified as likely to have profound long-term impacts 
on the industry recovery and therefore the options available to citizens. 
This is a very different situation to the Global Financial Crisis of 2008/9 
where public transport turned out to be quite resilient (Veeneman et al., 
2015). During the pandemic, public transport has taken an unprece-
dented hit both operationally and reputationally in most countries, and 
as governments eventually seek to reduce financial support for activities 
across the economy, there will be many other sectors competing with 
transport for funding. It may yet stimulate a need for further institu-
tional or regulatory change. 
Although there is a yearning in some parts of the policy system to ‘get 
back to normal’ or a ‘new normal’, we would argue that this is flawed 
thinking. Individuals, communities, businesses, supply chains and gov-
ernments have all adapted their activities, and for a sufficiently lengthy 
period of time for some of these behaviour changes to become materially 
embedded. The debt stock and the debate on what to do about it have 
been transformed and it is at least possible that, in combination with the 
longer term adaptations in travel behaviour that are plausible as a result 
of the pandemic, we will see new policy pathways to emerge. There is an 
obvious opportunity to try and align recovery measures with an accel-
eration of the transition to zero carbon, especially given the focus on 
more local- and active travel during the pandemic. However, as the crisis 
recedes, the space for other arguments emerges. The potential longer- 
term changes our interviews explored would create winners and 
losers, some of them very wealthy and influential interests such as those 
in the commercial property sector who have a vested interest in pro-
moting a return to patterns of consumption and work as similar to pre- 
pandemic conditions as possible. Similarly, transport institutions still 
seem firmly rooted in embracing growth as a means to justify infra-
structure expansion and may yet be slow to adapt to the necessity for 
lower demand futures to meet the Paris Climate Agreements (Brand 
et al., 2020). 
Whilst we can look forward to the lifting of physical distancing 
limitations at some point in 2021, the unfolding impacts of Coronavirus 
on our ways of living and our transport systems will take much longer to 
play out. Our research suggests that there are important contextual and 
institutional reasons why radical change was not likely to happen 
quickly, but that does not mean that it could not be profoundly impor-
tant in the years ahead. 
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